| IN THE MATTER |
of an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions for leave to apply for Order for committal. |
Supreme Court
Action No. 25 of 1980
18th February, 1980.
Staine, CJ.
Director of Public Prosecutions, supporting the Motion
Mr. Dean Barrow, for the Respondent
Contempt of Court – Reporter Newspaper – Newspaper Article containing statements and articles highly scandalous of Judges of the Supreme Court and intended to obstruct public justice by bringing the Supreme Court and the administration of justice into disrepute – Meaning of the word “scandalous” in contempt of court proceedings – Necessity of reading alleged scandalous article to gather its overall meaning – Article connoting that Judges of the Supreme Court susceptible to political influence – Whether mens rea is a requirement of a contempt proceedings where the allegation is that the court has been scandalous by the publication of an article – Standard of proof necessary to prove contempt of court – What constitutes ‘publication’ of an article – Appropriate penalty.
JUDGMENT
This is the motion by the Director of Public Prosecutions of Belize for an Order that the Respondent Harry Lawrence, editor of the newspaper entitled “The Reporter”; be committed for contempt in publishing an article containing a letter addressed to that newspaper, and which letter contained statements and comments which tend to obstruct public justice by bringing the authority of the Supreme Court and its administration into disrepute and disregard. Preliminary arguments were heard on the 11th February, following. The Action came on for hearing on the 13th February, 1980.
Attached to the Motion of the Director of Public Prosecutions was the opening statement contained in an Affidavit that his office paid an annual subscription to the Reporter Press for the weekly delivery to his office of a copy of the Reporter, and in accordance with an agreement an issue bearing the date 27th January, 1980 was delivered and received at his office on the 26th January, 1980.
In the said copy of the newspaper to which reference has been made there appeared on page 2 thereof a letter to the editor under the heading ‘Strange Ways’.
I would at this stage say in passing that in a supporting Affidavit the Respondent Harry Lawrence has admitted to being the publisher of the Reporter newspaper, and also of having published the offending letter.
In respect of the letter appearing in the newspaper, attached to his Affidavit, the Director of Public Prosecutions has submitted in paragraph 7 of his Affidavit a submission in which he declares that in his opinion the said letter contained in the particular issue of the newspaper statements and comments which are scandalous of the Judges and of the Supreme Court of Belize, and which, are calculated to obstruct public justice by bringing the Supreme Court’s authority and administration of the laws of Belize into disrepute and disregard to certain matters.
The Director of Public Prosecutions thereafter sets out in six separate paragraphs matters to which he draws attention and argues that they are in contempt of court. These are from (a) to (f):
(a) ‘Our Supreme Court seems to be acting in Strange Ways’.
(b) ‘Certainly it has disillusioned the many good citizens,
(c) ‘Approximately half the country, who had put their trust in the ability of the Courts, to hear an election petition and intervene to correct a fraud’.
(d) ‘As I see it even if we were to appeal here, it would not do any good for our country seems to have lost all concept of what is right and what is strange.’
(e) ‘Truth is no longer a fixed star’.
(f) ‘The politicians now have the ability to change and distort it at will.’
(g) ‘It also amazes me that the very people who profess to be intelligent are the ones who are undermining our moral weakening of the country by destroying the will within us.’
I would say at this point that the very fact of imputing the lack of impartiality on the part of the Courts is, by virtue of the authorities, a matter which is scandalous. I may return to this theme, and if I do, I hope it is properly understood that what I am attempting to do by virtue of such dicta that fall from my lips, is to make it abundantly clear, that in the context of contempt of court, “scandalous” does not bear the same meaning as it does in everyday parlance. The definition or view should be borne in mind throughout the context of this judgment.
It also seems an appropriate point at which I might interject a case the product from my own researches. I quote from the judgment in the case of R v Hinds ex parte the Attorney General. This case is reported at (1960) 3 WIR p 13, and I quote from the judgment of Stoby, CJ where, speaking about scandalizing the Court, the learned Chief Justice had this to say:
“In all the cases dealing with contempt of court by scandalizing the Court or a judge, great stress is laid on the right of the press to criticize. In a democracy the right of the press to criticize the conduct of public men is readily treated as one of the great safeguards of a free society. Any man, be he judge, magistrate, politician or civil servant, must expect to have his conduct exposed to public glare. The knowledge that legitimate and forceful criticism will be forthcoming acts as a check to arbitrary actions by public men. Perhaps knowledge that criticism will be forthcoming acts as a check to arbitrary actions by public men. Perhaps nowadays criticism is not always employed with the purest of motives. With the advent of a wider reading public, of greater competition among newspapers, pandering to public taste has become more important than constructive criticism. The Christian virtue of charity, the desire not to misrepresent facts, are gradually becoming lost virtues, but public men must be prepared to have their actions analysed in the light of what the modern press consider appropriate, and, provided the law is not infringed, bad taste and dishonest criticism must be treated as the penalty for temporary importance. But although the press has a notable duty to perform, it is not an unbridled champion. When it elects to condemn the administration of justice it must take care that the structure is rotten and deserves condemnation; for great and essential as is the function of the press, the necessity for public confidence in the administration of justice is greater.”
I have thought it desirable to intersperse at this point, the products of my own research. For, when one speaks of an article which is calculated to have a certain effect, I think it is desirable that in drawing attention to the judgment of a court, with the intention of showing how that Court in similar circumstances has dealt with the situation, the prevailing conditions should be, as nearly as possible, the same or similar in so far as that objective can be attained. The case of R v Hinds was a case decided by the Supreme Court of Barbados, which has a population or had in 1960 a population of 234,000 persons and a Bench of three. In Belize, we have a population varying, according to statistics which may not be altogether reliable, between 120,000 and 160,000. We, likewise, in referring to the Supreme Court, are referring to a Bench of three. It can be seen therefore that when one speaks of the Judges of the Supreme Court, one is speaking of the Bench which it is not difficult to envisage nor difficult to identify, having regard to our size and our population.
This fact should constantly be borne in mind when one is considering whether the Supreme Court of Belize and the Judges thereof have been scandalized, or whether the Court authority and the administration of the laws in Belize has been bought into disrepute and disregard.
Elaborating on his submissions to the Court, the learned Director of Public Prosecution continue outlining what he had read as being a true meaning of the letter captioned “Strange Ways.”
He submitted that in order to gather the true meaning of the letter, it was necessary to read it in its entirety, in order first to see what view the letter really intended to canvass, and secondly to see what could be understood from the expressions contained in the letter having regard to its entire contents.
In this connection, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the writer of the letter was intending to convey to the readers thereof his view that there was no purpose in presenting disputed election petitions to the Supreme Court, because that Court, it would appear, was not acting impartially, and that since we were still under British rule it might perhaps, it would appear, be better to appeal to the Supreme Courts in England when such actions as those eliciting an election petition or petitions arose. And, continued the learned Director of Public Prosecutions, the writer of the letter did not leave his readers without the answer to the questions he had posed. He continued, in paragraph 4 of the letter under reference, to state that the Supreme Court was simply acting in strange ways as disillusioned among good solid citizens, approximately half the country who had put their trust in the ability of the Courts to hear an election petition and intervene to correct a flaw. Continuing in this vein, the writer continued, said the Director of Public Prosecutions, that it would seem that the country seemed to have lost all concept of what is right and what is wrong, and in the context of the whole letter by referring to the whole country the writer was clearly intending to include the Judges of the Supreme Court.
Continuing, the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the writer of the letter in expressing himself, intended to convey to his readers, that truth was no longer a fixed star and the politicians had the ability to change and distort it at will. In substance, submitted the Director, this was clearly saying that the Supreme Court of this country is susceptible to political influence. This would necessarily connote that the Supreme Court was not free from bias, but which is worse, had become the servant to all politicians whose bidding the Supreme Court had to carry out.
Approaching the end of his submissions, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that when read as a whole, the clear meaning of the letter was that it was referring specifically to the Judges of the Supreme Court. And the letter went on to suggest that this was being done with the sole purpose of subjugating the Supreme Court by destroying its independence by virtue of this power to change and distort truth at will.
In support of his several submissions and contentions the learned Director of Public Prosecutions had in the course of supporting this motion to rely on certain decisions expressed in the following cases, or at least some of them:
(1) R v Editor, New Statesman (1928) 44 T. L. R. 301. This case is useful because the publication produces in full an entire judgment of the whole of the Kings Bench Division. In short it was that by virtue of the offending article the authority of the learned judge was likely to be lowered.
(2) R v Gray (1900) 2 Q. B. D pg 36. This was a case that had to do with a scurrilous personal abuse of a judge, with the reference to his conduct as a judge in a judicial proceeding, which had terminated, but nevertheless an action for contempt of court was brought.
The judge in this case affected by the publication was Mr. Justice Darling, and the case is interesting from several standpoints, but it is not necessary to here set them out in full for the purpose of this judgment, the basic principles extant in this case arise in other cases cited in this judgment. This case remains one of the principal pillars of the law of contempt of court, and hardly any case dealing with criminal contempt of court is ever heard without reference to this case.
(3) Ambard v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago (1936) Appeal Cases pg. 322. The judgment of interest is contained at page 327.
(4) Attorney General v The Times Newspaper Limited (1974) Appeal Cases page 273. This was a case decided by the House of Lords, in so far as precedent is concerned. It is a case which binds all lower courts and for this reason alone is an important reference. But what makes the case of even greater interest is that in the course of delivering judgment, the court had recourse to refer to a large number of cases decided prior to the giving of this decision and also it had ex necessitate to canvass the law in full regarding contempt of court, and in particular, contempt as it arises out of pending proceedings. For this reason alone the case is worthy of the utmost attention.
Finally the case of R v Almon (1765) 20 St. Tr. 803. This case is contained in a reference appearing at paragraph 3458 of Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice. The edition is the 40th Edition published in 1979, but reference to this case is also to be found in Volume 8 of Halsbury’s Laws of England 3rd Edition, in Borrie & Lowe on Contempt of Court, First Edition published in 1973 and Oswald’s Contempt of Court 3rd Edition published in 1910.
In setting out his arguments to the Court, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that reading the article as a whole, one could not escape the conclusion that what the writer of this letter was trying to convey to his readers, was that the Supreme Court judging by its actions had, in the words of paragraph 4 ‘behaved in strange way’. He then gave the answer that why a reader of this letter would come to the conclusion that it had behaved in strange ways was because it seemed that the Judges of the Supreme Court had now become mere pawns of the politicians. It was possible to arrive at this conclusion because by their behaviour; they had disillusioned the many good solid citizens, approximately half the country who had put their trust in those very Judges to hear (and determine) and intervene to correct a fault. And then the letter went on to state, it would be useless to appeal here; it would do no good. And it would do no good because the entire country seemed to have lost all concept of what is right and what is wrong; and in saying the entire country one of course had to include the three Judges who comprised the Supreme Court of Belize. And by going on to say that “truth is no longer a fixed star,” the writer of the letter explained what he meant; and his meaning was that politicians have the ability to change and distort truth at will. That can only mean that the politicians could tell the Judges to bend the truth, the Judges had of course to carry out the wishes of the politicians, so that when one looks at it, one was not looking at a Court which was made up of Judges who acted independently, but of Judges who served at the whim and fancy of their political masters. If this was so then this letter was in the clearest terms expressing an opinion that the court was partial and therefore, this was scandalous and in contempt of court.
In closing the learned Director of Public Prosecutions dealt with one final point, and that was to pose the question as to whether mens rea was a necessary ingredient to this particular charge of contempt of court. He drew the Court’s attention to paragraph 3458 of Archbold, 40th Edition published in 1979 where the case of R v Almon St. Tr. page 803 was quoted, and in which paragraph it said that in that case, it was held that it is contempt of court to publish matter scandalising the court only if the publication is intended to have that effect. The learned Director of Public Prosecutions then went on to point out that in all honesty he was bound to bring this to the notice of the Court. He himself not having any personal or other interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and he thus felt obliged to draw to the attention of the Court any case or note or matter, whether in favour or against the Respondent. The learned Director of Public Prosecutions drew the Court’s attention to the Affidavit sworn to and filed by the Respondent, that in paragraph 5 thereof. The Respondent had deposed to the fact that he had published the words contained in the letter without malice and in good faith, and that, therefore, he the learned Director of Public Prosecutions was in no position to contradict the Respondent in this instance, and that he could not find any evidence of intention to scandalise the Courts.
The learned Director of Public Prosecutions did however observe that nowhere in his Affidavit had the Respondent made even a provisional apology to the Court, although in paragraph 10 of the same Affidavit, the Respondent averred his personal respect for the authority of the Supreme Court, for the administration of justice, and he declared that he regarded it as that of his duty and of his newspaper to do all he could to uphold and maintain the dignity and authority of the Court. That brought the submissions of the learned Director to a close.
In replying, Mr. Dean Barrow commenced by paying tribute to the learned Director of Public Prosecutions for his actions in making his submissions, and for what Mr. Barrow considered in the highest traditions of the Court and the profession, in drawing the Court’s attention to the requirement of mens rea in a case of contempt of court, where that contempt is based upon scandalizing of the Court and the Judges thereof. Mr. Barrow adverted to this all important requirement, and the learned Director of Public Prosecutions as the mover of the motion, having made reference to it, and drawing the Court’s attention to the existence of this paragraph appearing in Archbold along with the separate case of R v Almon, he felt obliged to say in all frankness that he would like to pay a genuine tribute to the Director of Public Prosecutions and laud his action in this case. It was unfortunate that the case itself was not available for the Court’s perusal, but the fact that it was contained in Archbold would tend to lend support to the learned editor of Archbold’s viewpoint, and having regard to the pre-eminence of Archbold as a reliable reference in the profession, he was sure the court would take cognisance of it. Mr. Barrow then submitted that the learned Director of Public Prosecutions had failed to prove the elements of the charge of contempt of court. This failure was in three principal spheres. The first failure lay in the proof that in publishing the letter, the Respondent had done so with a clear intention to scandalize the Court. In this connection, Mr. Barrow pointed out that the standard of proof in this case, as in all criminal cases, was proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Barrow’s second submission was that the learned Director of Public Prosecutions had failed to prove publication within the meaning of that term, i.e. publication to a third person. It is true that the letter had been published to the learned Director of Public Prosecutions, but that was not sufficient even in the face of the admission by the Respondent of having been the publisher of the letter. What was required, as is required in cases of defamation, and here Mr. Barrow quoted a case decided by a judge of this Court, was publication to a third person. He was citing a decision given in a case which dealt with publication in the law of defamation, and the law relating to publication in the case of contempt of court bore the same meaning, although he was unable to point to any decided case or any authority persuasive or otherwise, but submitted it was a matter of common sense. Mr. Barrow’s third submission was that the reading of the letter elicited no material which could be construed as being contemptuous of the Court or Judges in any form or way, and a plain reading of the words as set out, however much one strained, that could not amount to anything which could be said to be contemptuous of the Court or Judges of the Court.
Mr. Barrow adverted to many of the same cases to which the learned Director of Public Prosecutions had made reference and elaborated on each facet of the instances where he said the motion had to fail because of a lack of evidence.
Further, Mr. Barrow referred to Borrie & Lowe on the Law of Contempt and also made reference to Action No. 30/70 the case of defamation heard by this Court by the then Puisne Judge. But the burden of Mr. Barrow’s arguments was upon the meaning to be attributed to the letter of which complaint is made, and which is headed “Strange Ways” and he suggested that a plain reading of this matter elicited nothing scurrilous, and to this end he dealt at great length on paragraph 7 of the Director’s Affidavit which set out the matters complained of, and rounded off his arguments by inviting the Court to look at all the evidence in the case and to say that the case had not been proved to the satisfaction of the Court.
In the course of the hearing of this matter, I have had the assistance of Counsel on both sides and I would like to record my gratitude for their concise arguments, numerous references to authorities (sometimes too numerous), not to mention the patience with which they have borne my several idiosyncrasies’ references to Borrie & Lowe on Contempt of Court and also to Oswald on Contempt of Court, as well as to the West Indian Report which I have mentioned, and the case of R v Mendez, the last case before this to be heard in this Court, dealing with the contempt of court. That was a case heard in 1955 before then Acting Chief Justice the Hon. C. G. X. Henriques Q. C., and appearing at page 265 of the Government Gazette for 1955. I may in due course, make a brief reference to this case, as there it sets out rather fully the law dealing with contempt of court and seems to have treated the matter with some seriousness, since it appeared at that time that that case was as far as records went, among the first of its kind in this country. Happily for me, what I have to do now is to follow in the wake of Mendez, and close the gap of 25 years; but it would be well if those who are concerned with the administration of law, dispensing of justice and in particular those concerned with the publishing world, were to bear in mind the principles set out by the Honourable Chief Justice at the time.
Whilst the Director of Public Prosecutions has in this Action set out in an Affidavit sworn to by himself, the meaning of the article “Strange Ways”, and has seriatim attempted to deal with the meaning attributable to that article in paragraph 7 of his Affidavit, I do not think that the Court is constrained to follow the same path which he trod, and I believe it is open to me without departing too far afield, to look at the article with my own mind’s eyes, and to see what I can make of it in so far as attributing to it a meaning, is concerned.
My intention is to deal first with the submission that in a case of contempt of court which raises the issue that the Court is scandalized, to see how far it holds true that one of the necessary elements to be proved in that offence is the element of intention. Secondly, I will deal with publication and finally, I shall address myself to whether the article can be said to be in contempt of court.
Dealing first with the submission that in order to prove the offence of contempt where it is alleged that the article is scandalous of the Judges of the Supreme Court, and is calculated to obstruct public justice by bringing the Supreme Court’s authority and administration of the law in Belize into disrepute and disregard, and also that intent is an ingredient, I would first address myself to the submissions of the learned Director of Public Prosecutions and his reference to paragraph 3458 of Archbold 40th Edition, the case of R v Almon. The reference given in Archbold is 20 St. Tr. Pg. 803 and in the course of the hearing, this report was not available nor, were the contents thereof discussed in any way because of the lack of finding the reports of State Trials. However, happily, I have had the fortune of discovering an alternative report of this case, and that report is contained in Volume 97 of the English Reports at page 94. I would say that the finding of this case has been most fortunate, because it has thrown light on a matter which otherwise might have led to serious misconceptions, incongruity and irreconcilable differences. The first thing to note about the case of R v Almon, is that as far as a decided case goes R v Almon is not a decided case. Nor is it a proposition of law for anything. It may be of some persuasive effect, but even that is of grave doubt. I am able to say this authoritatively because of the reasons I give below.
At page 94 of the Report and in a footnote, presumably by one of the editors of this vintage report, there appears in footnote (a) the following words: “This opinion was not delivered in Court, the Prosecution having been dropped in consequence, it is supposed, of the death of the then Attorney General Sir Fletcher Norton, but it was thought to contain so much legal argument on an important subject as to be worthy of being preserved. The action was a motion in Kings Bench by the Attorney General for a judgment against Mr. Almon for publishing a pamphlet entitled etc. etc.”
So it seems what happened in this case was that the learned authors of Archbold (and they are not alone in this misleading exercise), having come across this reference whether in the English Reports or in State Trials, have gone on to insert this case as the authority that it proposed, and this has given rise to many anxious moments; for hitherto the elements of mens rea has never been known to surface in cases dealing with contempt of court, except in ways which are readily explainable. It may be that the State Trials series have not had the opportunity contained in the English records which does contain the note that as far as Almon is concerned, it is merely the opinion of a judge which was written but never delivered in a Court of law because of the reasons explained in the footnote in the English Reports. This aspect of this case has since I discovered it, troubled me and thrown into a different perspective, my regard for the authority of Archbold, which I have always tended to regard as of utmost reliability.
The case, however, having turned out to be but an opinion, now allows me to understand more clearly the reasoning in the case heard by the Court of Appeal and which case I was beginning to have some doubt as to its interpretation. I am referring to the case of the Attorney General v Butterworth (1963) 1 Q. B. D. page 696.
This was a case of contempt of court which had to do with proceedings pending in the court, and the question there was whether a person could be held as being in contempt of court with respect to proceedings pending in a Court when the matter had already been disposed of. The case came before the Court of Appeal which comprised Lord Denning, M. R. and Donovan LJ and Pearson LJ. In the course of the hearing the argument arose as to whether there was any precedent for holding that an action lay in respect of proceedings pending for an act committed in respect of a case already heard and in that case Denning MR dealing with a hypothetical case said that he could see no difference between a case where a witness in a case was attack on the way to court to give evidence, the sole reason for his attack being that he was giving evidence, and a case where a man was attacked after he had given evidence, but an attack because he in fact had given evidence. Denning MR went on to say that he thought the distinction lay this way, and his words were: “I think the short answer to this contention is that contempt of court is a criminal offence punishable summarily by the Court itself, and, like all criminal offences, it requires in general a guilty mind.” The guilty mind or mens rea or intention to which Denning MR was referring was that in the case where the man is attacked while proceeding to Court to give evidence, the matter is clear or at least clearer, especially where the attack is committed within the precincts of the Court. But if the same man, having given evidence, is going home and is attacked and perhaps injured, it is necessary in those circumstances to show that he was attacked because he had given evidence. And if that proof is forthcoming that would be contempt of court. So, the guilty mind would go to show the connection between the attack and the man’s giving evidence, because it could be argued that the man might well have been attacked for reasons other than giving evidence, and it is in that connection that Denning MR used the phrase ‘guilty mind’.
I am further reinforced in this view when I look at the judgment of Donovan LJ because there he said the question to be decided here as in all cases in all alleged contempt of court, is whether the action complained of is calculated to interfere with the proper administration of justice. There is more than one way of so interfering. The authority of a Court may be lowered by scurrilous abuse. Its effectiveness to do justice may be diminished or destroyed in a pending case by frightening intending witnesses from the witness box. After giving evidence a witness may be punished for having done so, thereby deterring potential witnesses in future cases from risking a like vengeance. I see no such difference between any of these three methods as makes the first two contempt of court, and the third not. Each is calculated to do the same thing, namely, to interfere with the proper administration of law in the Courts of Justice. The issue of fact remains. So the action is calculated to interfere with the administration of justice. Bearing that in mind, I do not think that intention is a necessary ingredient to this offence of contempt of court and certainly Almon is no authority for that proposition.
My second point deals with publication. No authority has been cited to me to indicate that publication here carries the same meaning as in the case of defamation, and on the contrary my research, in so far as I have been able to deal with the matter, leaves me to think that it is not a sound proposition of law. However, even conceding that it is so, there is sufficient publication here to satisfy either the law of defamation or contempt of court. In addition to the Affidavits of the mover of the motion, the learned Director of Public Prosecutions and that of the Respondent, there is on record the Affidavits of Mr. Lawrence Young, Mr. Philip Goldson and the Rev. Gerald Fairweather; having given evidence of what they conceived the article under reference to mean, and if that is so then the article must have been published to them. So that dispenses of the second objection.
The final leg of this argument is the construction that should be placed upon the article itself. As in all matters of this nature, I think that the article should be read as a whole and not cut up into segments separated, thereby distorting the meaning.
The letter is headed “Strange Ways” and the third paragraph starts off ‘I am not questioning the common sense of the politician nor of the voters’. So that makes it clear that the politicians and the voters are let off the hooks. The letter continues, ‘but since we are still under British rule why not appeal to the High Court in England in these election petitions’. One would ask why go to the High Court in England, and one is not left in suspense for too long. For comes the answer, ‘our Supreme Court seems to be acting in strange ways, certainly it has disillusioned the many good, solid citizens, approximately half the country, who had put their trust in the ability of the Courts to hear an election petition and intervene to correct a fraud’. So we are informed of the cause of the disillusionment, the failure of the Supreme Court to intervene and correct a fraud. So as I say we have the answer to the question for the cause of the disillusionment. My question now is why has the Supreme Court failed to intervene to correct this fraud, and the answer comes in the rest of the sentence, ‘As I see it even if we were to appeal here it would not do any good, for our country seems to have lost all concept of what is right and what is wrong.’ The three Judges of the Supreme Court must of necessity be included in this “our country” who seem to have lost all concept of what is right and what is wrong. ‘Truth is no longer a fixed star, the politicians now have the ability to change and distort it at will.’ So that the allegation here is that the Supreme Court no longer acts on truth, but are the servants or pawns of the politicians whose biddings they must do. To me that is a clear allegation that the Supreme Court in dealing with the election petitions have acted not on the “fixed star” which is “truth”, but have become partial to the politicians who as the article said have the ability to distort it at will. This approach does not require any interpolation or the interpretation or introduction of any new matter. It is simply a way of looking at an article trying to find out what the author meant. I find that the charge is proved, and that the article is a contempt of court having as it has, imputed partiality to the Court.
The question now is what is an appropriate sentence in a case of this nature. The contempt does not arise out of pending proceedings so that no great harm is likely to be done, at least not immediately to the parties to the election petitions, and although the Editor has not even made a conditional apology to the Court, he does in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit reaffirm his respect for the Court and its Judges and I am inclined to believe him and accept that he does respect the Court and its authority. Further, in the same paragraph he does seem to have taken some advice from parties he consulted, except that it may be that the advice tendered to him, does not concur with the view that I have taken of these matters. I think that in the circumstances, justice would be served by levying a fine upon the Respondent and he is hereby fined $200, to be paid within 21 days, in default 21 days simple imprisonment. The Respondent is also to pay the costs of these proceedings.
